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TREATY SEVEN AND GUARANTEED
REPRESENTATION
HOW TREATY RIGHTS CAN EVOLVE INTO
PARLIAMENTARY SEATS

KIERA L. LADNER

Most of the Canadian plains region is covered by the "Numbered Treaties" negotiated
in the 1870s between the government of the
Dominion of Canada, acting for the British
Crown, and the nations whose territories encompassed the area. Even at the time that the
treaties were negotiated, the various signatories had different assumptions about what they
actually meant. During the ensuing century and
more that the treaties have existed, their meanings have been reinterpreted. With the repatriation of the Canadian constitution in 1982,

giving treaty rights constitutional status and
protection from the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, the actual guarantees of the treaties have often been interpreted in a manner
inconsistent with current government policy
and quite possibly in a way that none of the
treaty negotiators for the Crown could have
imagined, let alone predicted, in the 1870s.
Although the Crown's prime objective was to
avoid American-style "Indian wars" by securing promises of peace from the First Nations'
leaders and to negotiate the surrender of lands
that could then be parceled out to incoming
Euro-Canadian settlers, the texts of the treaties did promise the Indigenous parties sovereignty on their remaining territory, and
particularly in the case of Treaty Seven, established that Indigenous leaders should share
the responsibility for maintaining peace and
order in the region. While it is always difficult
to interpret a document in the light of completely altered circumstances, I make the argument that Treaty Seven, at least, may be
legitimately interpreted in such a way as to
provide for guaranteed representation, at the
federal level, for the First Nations that were
parties to the treaty.

Kiera L. Ladner is a doctoral student in political science
at Carleton University. Her article liN it-acimonawin
Oma Acimonak Ohci: This Is My Story About
Stories" is forthcoming in Native Studies Review.
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Although a number of studies have been
conducted during the past several years suggesting that guaranteed parliamentary representation for Aboriginal peoples is compatible
with the Canadian electoral system, others
have suggested that such particularistic representation-giving special electoral rights to
one particular group-is unconstitutional. The
lack of consensus in the existing literature
about the constitutionality of guaranteed Aboriginal representation may be because all of
the studies have focused on integrating Aboriginal representation within the existing
electoral scheme. Like Iris Marion Young, most
scholars have conceptualized guaranteed representation as a means to rectify past injustices and inadequacies in the Canadian
political system, but ihhey had examined guaranteed representation as a pre-existing right
of Aboriginal peoples from before the repatriation of the constitution they might have
arrived at different, more consistent conclusions. 1
In this paper I argue that guaranteed parliamentary representation can legitimately be
derived from the peace and good order clause
that appears in the Numbered Treaties. In
Treaty Seven (as in all the Numbered Treaties) the peace and good order or "mutual"
clause reads as follows:
And the undersigned Blackfeet, Blood,
Piegan [sic] and Sarcee Head Chiefs and
Minor Chiefs, and Stony [sic] Chiefs and
Councilors on their own behalf and on behalf of all other Indians inhabiting the Tract
within ceded do hereby solemnly promise
and engage to strictly observe this Treaty,
and also to conduct and behave themselves
as good and loyal subjects of Her Majesty
the Queen. They promise and engage that
they will maintain peace and good order
between each other and between themselves
and other tribes of Indians, and between
themselves and others of Her Majesty's subjects, whether Indians, Half Breeds or
Whites, now inhabiting or hereafter to inhabit, any part of the said ceded tractj and

that they will not molest the person or
property of any inhabitant of such ceded
tract, or the property of Her Majesty the
Queen, or interfere with or trouble any person, passing or traveling through the said
tract or any part thereof, and that they will
assist the officers of Her Majesty in bringing to justice and punishment any Indian
offending against the stipulation of this
Treaty, or infringing the laws in force in
the country so ceded. 2
Because it is impossible to examine the
mutual or peace and order clause in each of
the western treaties, I have chosen to focus on
Treaty Number Seven, covering southern
Alberta, which was negotiated and signed by
Lieutenant-Governor David Laird, LieutenantColonel James MacLeod, and representatives
of the Siksika, North Peigan, Blood, Sarcee,
and Stoney First Nations at Blackfoot Crossing in September 1877. 3 Since my own research has so far focused only on the Siksika,
North Peigan, and Blood First Nations, I have
restricted my discussion only to these three signatories, though further research will probably
show that the same arguments can be made for
the Stoney and Sarcee nations as well.
I have examined not only the written words
of the treaty but also the intentions and understanding of each party (the Queen in Right of
Canada, Siksika, Peigan, and Blood). This provides a fuller understanding of what each party
actually meant by this clause in the treaty. This
is especially important because all of the historical documents have been written by only
one party to the treaty, the one that had the
most to gain in the writing of such documents.
Not only are there no written documents articulating an "Indian" understanding of the
treaty, but problems of translation render the
words of the treaty itself suspect as representing the "Indian" point of view.
THE PRE-TREATY UNDERSTANDING

By 15 July 1870, when the government of
Canada assumed jurisdiction over the North-
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West Territories and began treaty negotiations
there, its Indian policy had long been established. The Crown, represented first by the
colonial authories and then by the government of the Dominion of Canada, had been
negotiating various kinds of treaties with Aboriginal nations in North America for more
than two hundred years and had established
the conditions by which Indian lands were to
be obtained. In the Royal Proclamation of 7
October 1763, King George III declared that
all land held by or reserved for the "Nations
or Tribes of Indians," could only be "ceded or
purchased" by the Crown. Thus, the Royal
Proclamation set in motion a treaty-making
process by which the government secured
ownership to the land. The Royal Proclamation states that, "if at any time any of the said
Indians should be inclined to dispose of said
Lands, the same shall be purchased only for
Us, in our Name, at some public Meeting or
Assembly of the said Indians, to be held for
the Purpose."4
Although the Dominion of Canada had acquired the North-West Territories from the
Hudson's Bay Company, Canada did not have
title to the land itself, and the Dominion's
"control" of the territories was being threatened by American expansionism. At the end
of the American Civil War in 1865, Canada
faced an extremely well armed neighbor that
was expanding westward at an alarming rate,
and whose citizens were "eyeing the fate of the
Red and Saskatchewan River districts with interest."5 As Leroy Little Bear explains,
The United States was expanding very rapidly westward, and Canada and Britain were
trying to slow that expansion down, and
they were trying to limit the United States
as much as possible. So when the United
States was expanding westward, Canada had
to run westward, so to speak, and secure British Columbia so that British Columbia
would not join or be annexed by the United
States .... In the race westward, of course,
the "come on" item for British Columbia
joining Confederation was the building of
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the rail road. But then the government says,
"Hey we forgot about those Indians out
there. We have to secure the peace and
goodwill of those Indians."6
Not only did the government have to secure peaceful relations with the Aboriginal
nations in the west, they needed their land,
land upon which to build the railway and the
"national dream." Thus, the Treaties enabled
the building of the Canadian Pacific Railway,
and "enable[dl the Government to throw open
for settlement any portion of the land which
might be susceptible of improvement and profitable occupation."7
Sir John A. Macdonald, one of the "Fathers
of Confederation" and Canada's first prime
minister, envisioned a Canada stretching from
sea to sea. Thus his government needed treaties that would ensure geographic unity, assert
ownership over the land, and clear the way for
colonists, all aspects of Macdonald's "national
dream." At the same time, however, the Aboriginal peoples of the N orth-West still represented a considerable military threat to the new
Dominion's ambitions, and Macdonald also
needed treaties of "Peace and Friendship"
with the powerful Aboriginal nations. The
ongoing Indian wars south of the border were
examples of what Canada did not want, while
events closer to home underlined the need to
conclude peace. The Riel Rebellion in
Manitoba in 1869, in which the Metis or "Half
Breed" community successfully demanded a
recognition of its rights from the new Dominion of Canada; the Cypress Hills Massacre in
1873, in which American whiskey traders in
Saskatchewan murdered a group of Assiniboines, sparking the formation of the NorthWest Mounted Police to maintain order; the
arrival of Sitting Bull and his followers in the
Cypress Hills following the defeat of Custer in
1876; and the impressive retreat of the Nez
Perce toward the Canadian border in 1877 all
alarmed the Canadian government. Warnings
from missionaries such as the Reverend George
McDougall, who told of escalating violence
toward whites, or Father Constantine Scollen,

88

GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SPRING 1997

who wrote that "the Sioux Indians, now at
war with the Americans, have sent a message
to the Blackfeet Tribe, asking them to make
an alliance offensive and defensive against all
white people in the country," also prompted
Macdonald's government toward the treaty
process. 8
According to John Leonard Taylor, the
treaties offered the Canadian government an
alternative to the American experience, settlement "without the danger of the Indian wars
experienced in the United States." Taylor
found that "events in the United States provided an example of what settlement could
mean to Indians. Destruction of game, loss of
territory, disease, and wars with American
troops made the period a desperate one for the
Indians of the Western United States."9 Canadian Indians knew what had happened to
American Indians and how Louis Riel had been
forced to flee from Red River as well as of
worsening fur trade relations and declining
resources. Both the Indians and the government entered into treaty negotiations with
some urgency in 1871, hoping to avoid similar
confrontations or destitution:
"Peace, order, and good government," the
phrase from the British North America Act that
defined the powers of Canada's federal government, could apparently be served by negotiating treaties with the Aboriginal nations of
the North-West. Specifically, however, the
government wished to get title to the land for
as little as possible, to bring the Indians under
Dominion control on reserves where they
would not wreak havoc on prospective EuroCanadian settlers in the West, and to deliver
them up to be "instructed, civilized and led to
a mode of life more in conformity with the
new position of this country, and accordingly
[made into] good, industrious useful citizens
. . . [who would] do without assistance from
the government."IO This desire to establish
peace and order-on Euro-Canadian termsis evident in an 1875 letter to the Reverend
George McDougall from Lieutenant Governor Morris, requesting McDougall to proceed
in telling the Crees about the upcoming treaty

negotiations and to urge them to establish
peace with other Indians and whites. ll
Just as the Canadian government wanted a
treaty, most of the Aboriginal {Indian and
Metis) inhabitants wanted a treaty with the
Crown. One could argue that the Blackfoot
Confederacy wanted a treaty with ninawak, the
Queen, or Chief Woman, but not every
Blackfoot leader was an avid supporter of a
treaty or even considered such a thing prior to
1877. For instance, Edward Yellowhorn, Peigan
elder and.son of the last traditional chief, said
that when the North-West Mounted Police first
arrived in Blackfoot territory they wanted to
negotiate a treaty, but Bull Head (Peigan Chief
who, according to Yellowhorn, died that winter) refused and told the police that he would
not give them any of his land, and that they
would be permitted only to winter in his territory that year. 12
Nonetheless, both oral and written accounts
attest that the Blackfoot Confederacy welcomed the North-West Mounted Police and
accepted their help in maintaining peace and
order. 13 The majority of the Blackfoot leaders,
particularly Crowfoot, soon agreed to "stop
killing each other and not to kill white people
that came into their territory."14 After a few
"fairly peaceful" years, however, the situation
began to worsen as the buffalo population declined, traditional enemies such as the Crees
and Metis encroached upon Blackfoot territory, and Euro-Canadians trickled in and
settled on Blackfoot lands. IS As Leroy Little
Bear suggests, the problem was quite simple:
diminishing buffalo and First Nations intrusions into each other's hunting territories meant
"there is more chances you're going to run into
your enemy. Which would mean that there is
sure to be battles, there is sure to be fights because they are going to want to protect their
territory. What do we need to do? Make peace .
See, so the Indian mind was talking about peace
and good order and so on."16
Thus, the Blackfoot chiefs at all levels of
the Confederacy looked toward the NorthWest Mounted Police and the Queen they represented for assurances that past promises

TREATY SEVEN

would be kept and that peace would be maintained. They held numerous discussions with
the police, missionaries, and the commander
of the Canadian militia in which they discussed the problems arising in their territory
and their desire to negotiate with the Queen
measures to restrict other groups' access to
their land as well as other matters concerning
peace and justiceY
The entire council of the Blackfoot Confederacy met to discuss the worsening situation and possible remedies including both war
and peace. As a result of one such meeting,
Jean L'Heureux drew up and sent a petition to
Lieutenant Governor Morris on their behalf.
This petition addresses Blackfoot grievances,
requests that intruders be kept out of their territory until a treaty is made, and urges the
representatives of the Queen to negotiate a
treaty that would ensure peace by limiting "the
invasion of our Country" and keeping traditional enemies and Americans out. IS This petition, according to Hugh Dempsey, illustrates
that the Blackfoot were "more concerned about
Crees and Metis slaughtering buffalo in
Blackfoot hunting grounds and white men
building in their best wintering grounds than
they were about the need for a treaty."19 Concerns about territorial intrusion and depleting
resources continued to echo in correspondence
and discussions between missionaries, such as
Father Constantine Scollen, and government
officials, particularly Morris and Laird, well
after the negotiation of Treaty Seven in September 1877.20
The correspondence demonstrates that the
Blackfoot were seeking assistance in maintaining peace and order in their territory and
often mentions the promise or treaty that Edward Yellowhorn referred to as having been
made by the North-West Mounted Police.
Although some of the writers mention willingness on the part of the Blackfoot to share
or even cede their land, the accuracy of this
"documentation" is questionable as it contradicts other written accounts and much, if not
all, of the Blackfoot oral historyY Evidence
is fairly conclusive that the Blackfoot sought
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to negotiate a treaty that would lead to peace
within Blackfoot society and within the entire Blackfoot territory. The North-West
Mounted Police would keep out settlers, enemies, and American traders.

THE TREATY PERIOD

Thus, while the government entered into
the treaty negotiations in 1876 to obtain a
land surrender, the majority of the Indians had
no intention of surrendering any of their land
but rather of gaining police assistance in keeping the Crees and Metis out and in restricting
buffalo hunting and the use of poison. 22 While
the true intentions and the understandings of
both parties to the treaty will continue to be
questioned, negotiated, and mediated, the
treaty was, in the words of the Reverend J.
McDougall,
a most notable event pregnant with farreaching consequences. [Notwithstanding
the intentions and interpretations of each]
the aboriginal man with his traditions unchanged through the centuries [sic] met face
to face representatives of another old but
ever-changing race to negotiate in peace and
friendship their future relations in this new
land. 23
According to John Taylor, "the government
view of the treaty was that of an instrument
of land surrender with provisions for a quid
pro quo in terms of annuities, reserves of land,
and other traditional items."24 Those sources
written by agents of the government place
very little emphasis on the peace and order
clause. In fact, "the making of this treaty,
which completed the series of treaties extending from Lake Superior to the slopes of
the Rocky Mountains," was basically seen as
a land surrender by the Dominion government
in 1877.25 Nonetheless, although most of the
treaty text detailed what the government
would give the Indians for their traditional
territories, the representatives of the Crown
at least mentioned and explained {albeit
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ambiguously) the mutual clause to their Indian counterparts.
According to Morris, who relied primarily
on Laird's first hand experience to create the
most notable written account of the negotiation of Treaty Seven, the commissioners explained to their "captive" Indian audience that
they
could not agree to exclude the Crees and
Half-breeds from the Blackfoot country; that
they were the Great Mother's children as
much as the Blackfeet and the Bloods, and
she did not wish to see any of them starve.
Of course the Crees and Half-breeds could
be prosecuted for trespassing on their reserves. In this the Indian Act secured them.
The local government had passed a law to
protect the buffalo. It would have a tendency to prevent numbers from visiting their
country in the close season. But to altogether
exclude any class of the Queen's subjects, as
long as they obeyed the laws, from coming
into any part of the country, was contrary to
the freedom which she allowed her people,
and the Commissioners would make no
promise of this kind. 26
With this, the commissioners, at least according to written history, excluded from the treaty
all that the Blackfoot were seeking.27 Morris
also (indirectly) indicates what the peace and
order clause did not mean to the representatives of the Crown.
The Blackfoot sought protection of their
lands and their lifestyle, but the government
instead offered up the same peace and order
clause that had appeared in the previous N umbered Treaties. As Laird explained, this treaty
made the whites and Indians "brothers" under
laws that had to be obeyed by both if they
wished to remain as "brothers" and if the Indians wished to keep the North-West Mounted
Police as friends and not foes. LieutenantColonel MacLeod similarly alluded to the
meaning of this particular clause, stating, as
he often had in the past, "the police will continue to be your friends, and be always glad to

see you. On your part you must keep the
Queen's laws, and give every information ro
them in order that they may see the laws obeyed
and offenders punished."z8
The idea of peace and friendship that was
advocated by the Queen's representatives was
different from that articulated by the Blackfoot
prior to the negotiation of the Treaty. Instead
of viewing "peace and good order" in terms of
"protecting" the Blackfoot and their territory,
the government saw peace in terms of colonization and laws made by Parliament, applicable
to a11, and enforced by the N orth- West
Mounted Police, possibly with the assistance
of tribal leaders when a Blackfoot person was
suspected of breaking the law. In fact Treaty
Seven was more restrictive than government
officials had been as recently as 1874, when
David Laird, as minister of the Interior, had
written Morris suggesting that Aboriginal nations, particularly the Metis, should be allowed
to form their own government "within reasonable limits," as long as they "treaded] everyone fairly."29 Although written histories claim
that the Blackfoot understood and agreed to
the terms of the treaty in full, this is not so.
Morris claims that the majority of the Chiefs
spoke of their gratitude toward the North-West
Mounted Police and their desire to have these
friends stay in their territory on the same basis
as before. Beyond this it is doubtful that the
Indian adherents to the treaty understood it in
anything like the same manner that the EuroCanadians did.
In a letter Father Scollen asked Colonel
A. G. Irvine of the North-West Mounted Police, "Did these Indians, or do they now, understand the real nature of the treaty made
between the Government and themselves in
1877? My answer to this question is unhesitatingly negative, and I stand prepared to substantiate this proposition. "30 This lack of
agreement on the meaning of the treaty resulted in part from problems of translation,
the nonexistence of a Blackfoot equivalent
for terms like "square mile," deliberate misrepresentation by representatives of the
Crown, and the fact that the Blackfoot had a
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completely different world view from the EuroAmericans.J1 Nor were the Treaty Seven Commissioners completely clear or truthful about
their intentions, as can be seen in the following statement by Laird: "In a very few years
the buffalo will probably be all destroyed, and
for this reason the Queen wishes to help you
live in the future in some other way .... The
Commissioners would strongly advise the Indians to take cattle ... at least as long as you
continue to move about in your lodges."32 Laird
never had in mind a pastoral herding life in
which the Blackfoot Confederacy replaced the
buffalo with domestic cattle-such a statement
had no reference to reality. As Blackfoot political scientist Andrew Bear Robe put it,
the Treaty 7 negotiations of 1877 between
the treaty commissioners and the Indian nations that signed that treaty talked about
the need for peaceful co-existence and secondly, to let the Queen's white children
come live on Indian lands. There was no
talk about ending "the Indian way of life"
which surely included the continuation of
some form of Indian sovereignty and jurisdiction. 33
The Blackfoot Confederacy did not discuss
"white man's law," Indian sovereignty, jurisdiction over Blackfoot territory, and paternalistic government practices and structures
because the people assumed that they would
continue to live as they had since "time immemorial."34 Thus, the leaders of the Blackfoot
Confederacy agreed to live in "peace and good
order," a condition in which all people would
live in peaceful co-existence, respecting others' ways of doing things. White people would
have to respect the "Indian way of life," as the
Blackfoot did not expect to give up their sovereignty nor their control of their territories.
Many chiefs expected white settlers to respect
and adapt to their ways, just as the Blackfoot
had to Euro-Canadian ways, when the new way
did not contradict or hobble their own. 35
The Blackfoot also saw the promise to maintain "peace and good order" and to abide by
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the Queen's laws as a continuum with the past.
According to Edward Yellowhorn it was the
North-West Mounted Police that offered up
this clause at the treaty negotiations, and it
was with them that the Blackfoot agreed to establish and maintain "peace and good order."
This idea was echoed in other interviews, particularly by Dorthy Yellowhorn, who suggested
that this promise had been broken many times
by the Police. 36 These ill-defined promises,
however, did not mean that the Blackfoot
peoples agreed to stop living by their own laws
or to supplant their own traditions with those
of the incoming society. As James MacLeod
wrote Lieutenant Governor Morris in 1875, the
Mounted Police had been successful in suppressing the whiskey traders, but the Blackfoot
people's had no intention of cooperating with
police attempts to prevent them from trading
with whomever they wished or to stamp out
polygamy and horse raidingY Rather, as
Dempsey suggests, the Blackfoot respected Canadian laws only when they were compatible
with and not contradictory to Blackfoot traditions. The Blackfoot Confederacy broke incompatible laws not to defy the Canadian
authorities but to uphold triballaw. 38
Thus, the leaders of the Blackfoot Confederacy, with no context for interpreting the intent of distant authorities in Ottawa or for
knowing that their promises would not be honored in a manner consistent with the "spirit
and intent" of the treaty, assumed that the treaty
meant they would continue to live as they had
since the North-West Mounted Police had arrived. According to Father Scollen, in fact,
their friendly relationship of mutual co-existence with their "benefactors," the North-West
Mounted Police, induced Blackfoot leaders to
agree to the treaty. As Scollen states, "It may
be asked: If the Indians did not understand
what the treaty meant, then why did they sign
it? Because previous to the treaty they had
always been kindly dealt with by the Authorities, and did not wish to offend them ... "39
Neither the Blackfoot, nor the Cree (in their
treaties), promised to give up their right to
live in mutual coexistence according to their
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own ways, or for that matter to control their
territory. Rather, the "mutual clause" may be
construed to have meant to the Blackfoot
Confederacy that the Indian and Euro-Canadian parties to Treaty Seven would coexist
peacefully as sovereign entities with their own
independent spheres of jurisdiction, assisting
the others in maintaining peace and good order when required and permitted by their own
traditions.
UNDERSTANDING THE TREATIES

The peace and good order clause in Treaty
Seven meant something different for all parties involved. Regardless of what was stated or
implied by the government agents at the negotiations, the government did not view the mutual clause (or the entire treaty) in the same
manner as did the Aboriginal nations. The government viewed all the treaties as the first step
in settling the West, and in "protecting," "civilizing," and "assimilating" the Indians. For them
the "mutual clause" represented the Indians'
promise to remain peaceful, to obey Canadian
laws, and to allow the government to exercise
its authority and jurisdiction over the entire
country.40
On the other hand, the Siksika, Peigan, and
Blood nations did not know of the Crown's
intentions but viewed the treaty as a continuation of past relations, as a means of securing
government assistance in dealing with declining buffalo populations and outside hunters,
and as a means of getting trade goods, helping
them adjust to a new way of life, and sharing
their land with relatively few farmers and ranchers,41 The Indians did not view the treaty as a
surrender of their land in exchange for recognition of "treaty rights." They would instead
establish (most likely through treaties) peace
with all others, and they would share their territory (with the very few white people they
expected) in accordance with their ways, while
respecting and abiding by the Queen's ways
wherever possible.
Despite the many different views of the
peace and order clause, no one seems to have

suggested a right to guaranteed electoral representation, an idea that emerged in Canadian politics only recently. The Canadian
government expected to maintain a Euro-Canadian version of peace and order in the whole
country, as Morris implied during negotiations of Treaty Six at Fort PittY This government assumption, however, contradicts the
oral histories of the Aboriginal peoples and
even the actions of the Dominion government
in 1885, calling upon the Aboriginal populance to playa role in maintaining peace and
good order in their respective territories.
Furthermore, during the treaty negotiations,
although there were many different issues
raised by individual members and the constituent bands and nations of the Blackfoot
Confederacy, there is no recollection of anyone's alluding to guaranteed parliamentary
representation. For the most part, it seems that
the Indigenous nations intended to retain their
sovereignty and not interfere with the EuroCanadian government or settlers so long as
they did not interfere with them. Thus, the
clause represents a promise for the Siksika,
Peigan, and Blood to uphold peace and order
within their own territories, including the territory they had agreed to share, and between
themselves and others. The government promised to maintain peace and order in the remainder of the country while respecting
aboriginal laws and ways of being and seeing.
Many Blackfoot present at the signing of
Treaty Seven expected the government and
any settlers to use resources according to
Blackfoot customs, such as paying the Blackfoot for wood. They expected non-Natives to
respect, obey, and abide by Blackfoot traditions, just as the Blackfoot would live under
the Queen's law insofar as it did not interfere
with their own ways. While the treaties established a relationship of peace and friendship and made promises of government
assistance, neither party renounced its sovereignty, and the leaders of the Blackfoot Confederacy accepted the responsibility for
maintaining peace and order in the territory
they agreed to share. The leaders of these
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peoples took the added responsibility to
"maintain peace and good order between ...
themselves and others of Her Majesty's subjects, whether Indians or whites, now inhabiting or hereafter to inhabit any of the said
ceded tracts ... "43
Although members of the Blackfoot Confederacy upheld "peace and order" every day,
it is not clear that any individual or group ever
attempted to hold any Euro-Canadian accountable within traditional Blackfoot territories,
although the Blackfoot had the right to do so.
The government of Canada and some segments of the public recognized this right during the North-West Rebellion in 1885, when
they contemplated enlisting the Blackfoot
Confederacy, including the Sarcees, to fight
against the "rebelling" Plains Cree and Metis.
According to Little Bear, this occurred
basically because the Blackfoot have agreed
not to go out and fight but we [the government] may need them to go and fight. Because the Crees are their traditional enemies,
let's let them fight against each other. We'll
tell them that it won't affect your Treaty.
That's the thinking behind that .... When
they're looking at peace and order, they're
looking at the larger picture. And saying
that we've signed an agreement, and in that
agreement we both said that we were going
to keep peace and order. Those guys there
are not behaving, so you have a responsibility.44
Except for using Sioux and Sarcee scouts,
runners, and informants, however, the government did not employ Indians, particularly
those of Treaty Seven, against the Cree and
Metis. 45 Macdonald was unsure if "a body of
Blackfeet [sic] under white command [could]
be trusted," and he was concerned about the
fear that would be sparked among settlers if
large numbers of well armed Indians were allowed to ride freely across the plains to the
scene of combat. Finally, however, Macdonald ruled out the military assistance of the
Blackfoot because although they were enemies
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of the Cree, the Confederacy had divided over
the Rebellion. 46
As a result, the government required Indians not involved in the Rebellion to pledge
their loyalty to the Queen or accept soldiers
stationed on their reserves to ensure they did
not join the uprising.47 The government used
the treaties to justify these actions, as did the
chiefs who pledged their loyalty.48 Hugh A.
Dempsey notes that it is unlikely the chiefs
were actually pledging loyalty to the Crown,
rather, "at all times [Crowfoot] was unswervingly loyal, not to the government, but to his
own people. This was the only reason for remaining at peace."49
While the government made some limited
use of the "peace and good order" clause in
1885, I believe that this is the only time that
the clause was invoked to give Indians a role
in reestablishing or maintaining peace and order off their reserves. Nonetheless, the interpretation of the clause providing Aboriginal
nations with a role in maintaining peace and
order is significant.
The government was attempting to resolve
the North-West Rebellion as quickly and as
cheaply as possible, and without the loss of
Euro-Canadian lives. Indians were inherently
expendable in the colonial scheme of things
because they were defined as a "vanishing" or
"dying" race. Hence the government gave no
thought to setting a precedent for twentieth
century interpretations of the treaty. The Indians did not vanish, however, and they continue
to exist today in a paternalistic and colonial
paradigm.
Although I lack information about the origins of the "peace and good order" clause,
James Youngblood Henderson suggests that at
the time of its first appearance in Treaty One,
before the formation of the N orth- West
Mounted Police, it was intended by the Colonial Office of the imperial government to
give responsibility for controlling the territories covered by each treaty to the Indians in
order to ensure that they remained the allies of
the Crown against the Americans. The Indians
offered a less costly, and perhaps more efficient,
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way of controlling territory not yet open to
Euro-Canadian settlement than did the systems
of control utilized by the United States or by
the Hudson's Bay Company.50 But while the
government may have viewed this as a temporary measure, since the Indians did not vanish
or die out, the treaty of 1877 is still a working
agreement, though one that has yet to be fully
understood and implemented. Such an understanding is not simple, however, especially if
one is applying the "Dickson Doctrine," standards established by the Canadian courts that
hold that treaties must be interpreted as meaning whatever they could reasonably have been
expected to mean to the Indians at the time of
signing. 51
The Blackfoot Confederacy did not believe
that they were ceding their land, their control
over their territory, or their sovereignty. Regardless of what the government had intended
and what policies and practices were implemented subsequent to the signing of Treaty
Seven, the Siksika, Peigan, and Blood, and
other signatory nations retained their sovereignty and their ability and right to govern
themselves according to their laws. They also
accepted the added responsibility for helping
to maintain peace and good order throughout
their traditional territory. The onslaught of
Euro-Canadian settlers and the demise of the
buffalo meant that the Blackfoot Confederacy
was never really able to practice this shared
power, but the Canadian government acknowledged it to some extent during the North-West
Rebellion.
While the peace and order clause was probably not properly translated nor fully explained
at the treaty negotiations, the wording of the
clause is, for the most part, compatible and
consistent with the Indian view. In Treaty
Seven, the Blackfoot promised to make and
keep peace with all others living within the
Confederacy's traditional territory, a pledge
consistent with the idea that this was a peace
treaty to ensure peaceful relations between
"friends" or "brothers" who would share land,
trade goods, and responsibilities but not sov-

ereignty. Blackfoot promises to "obey and abide
by the law" have to be understood in the context of the negotiations and the reality of the
time. Oral histories show that the Indian signatories did not fully understand the universal coverage of white law or that their laws
would be supplanted by it. The Blackfoot
would respect the Queen's law whenever possible, as they had been doing and newcomers
to their territories would respect their laws.
The Blackfoot Confederacy also promised to
help enforce that law ("they will assist the officers of Her Majesty in bringing to justice
and punishment any Indian"), clearly assuming a shared responsibility for maintaining
peace and order with the North-West Mounted
Police.
Determining exactly what the understanding means today is even more problematic
because according to a paper prepared for
and distributed by the research branch of the
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development (DIAND) the federal government has agreed that, "if the Treaty promises
are read as symbolic promises of more comprehensive services to be adapted to changing
circumstances, they take on a very different
meaning than if they are read as plain statements meaning precisely and exactly what they
say."52 While it would be easier to claim that
the treaty is merely what appears on the page,
this is not the Indian view of the treaty, and
the Indians have been upheld by the Supreme
Court of Canada.
Most of the people interviewed for this paper reported that the treaties were never finalized, and although their promises could
never be retracted or lessened, they should
continue to adapt to change. The statement:
"so long as the sun shines, [grass grows] and
the rivers flow" does not actually appear in
the Numbered Treaties, though it, or a similar version, appears constantly in the speeches
of Indians and non-Indians alike, and it is
actually included in the 1855 treaty between
the Blackfoot Confederacy and the United
States governmentY According to Henderson,
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however, this statement is representative of
Indian reality and philosophical traditions. It
is the "natural context that they are talking
about; they knew and experienced that ....
Those aren't metaphors, those were the actual
ways that they talked for the environment ...
and themselves-living with nature and not
making a distinction, a theory, of self."54
The Indigenous peoples were speaking from
their own reality, their own understanding of
the world around them, one very different
from the western ways of the dominant society.
If we understand the "Rivers Flow" statement
as a crucial expression of Indian philosophy
rather than a rhetorical flourish, it mandates
that the treaties, like the river, are not constant but something in an ever changing cycle
of life. The water in the river one moment
was not the same the next moment. In dry
years the river was shallow while in other years
it flooded. What was constant was that this
ever changing river continued to flow and
modify or adapt itself, as was needed, to a
changing reality. Before the building of huge
twentieth century dams Alberta's Indigenous
people believed no person could make a river
do what it did not want to do. Thus the huge
floods of 1995 came as no surprise to many
elders. The rivers are just reasserting themselves.
Many Blood, Peigan, and Siksika people
consider that much like a river, the treaty continues to exist and will continue to exist for as
long as can be envisioned, even though many
promises, like the rivers, have been dammed.
But like the river, Treaty Seven should change
with time to meet the needs of the people, the
same people (human and non-human beings)
for which this land was created. Promises such
as those concerning keeping peace and good
order have to be interpreted to reflect the situation today: The N orth-West Mounted Police
no longer exist and their successors are no
longer solely responsible for maintaining peace
and order on the Prairies, and the traditional
territories of the Blackfoot Confederacy are
"occupied" by "settlers" who do not respect
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traditional laws, traditional ways of being, or
the sovereignty of First Nations. Other clauses
in treaties have been modernized in this spirit.
For instance a clause in Treaty Six promising
a "medicine chest" to each group has been
interpreted as guaranteeing free health and
dental care to all status Indians across Canada,
regardless of which, if any, treaty covers the
individual.
While the "river analogy" provides a basis
for change, the belief that the treaty was never
finalized provides an alternate argument for
updating the treaty promises. This belief is
common throughout "Blackfoot Country,"
partly because Crowfoot, purposely, never
marked his "X" to it and because the Numbered Treaties merely allow for the sharing of
Indian lands, remaining silent on most other
matters. 55 Thus, the existing treaties could either be modernized to deal with such issues as
the sharing or imposition of jurisdiction and
sovereignty (for example through guaranteed
Parliamentary representation), or new treaties
could be drafted to deal with such issues. 56
Nonetheless, as Bear Robe states, even if
the treaties are not revisited, they are stillliving documents that include usable rights that,
as in the case of self-government, have lain
dormant.
Since the Indian treaties in Canada are all
silent as to the matter of continuing political and sovereign relations between the Indian Nations and the British sovereign, the
contemporaneous right to First Nation [Parliamentary representation] may be an "existing" treaty right pursuant to section 35 of
the Canadian ConstitutionY
Thus, even though the peace and order clause
is silent about particularistic representation,
it does not mean that there is no treaty right
to guaranteed representation. This parallels
the more familiar argument that the peace
and order clause can be construed to suggest
a treaty right to self-government, as there is
no mention of the Dominion government
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supplanting the sovereign governments of the
Indian nations. While there is no mention of
guaranteed representation, there is mention
of a responsibility to maintain peace and good
order throughout traditional Blackfoot territories, a responsibility at present carried out
by the federal and provincial governments and
their various agencies, which implicitly exclude First Nations. The Blackfoot Confederacy is now prevented from exercising a
responsibility specifically reserved to it by the
treaty.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRESENT

The Blackfoot Confederacy never viewed
the treaty as relinquishing their sovereignty or
their jurisdiction within their traditional lands
but rather in terms of sharing and as a means
of securing help in dealing with the demise of
the buffalo and the advent of Euro-Canadian
settlers. For many, including Crowfoot, the
treaty offered hope for the future, a vision of
the future different from the starvation predicted by many elders. It was a dream in which
the Queen would look after them and teach
them her ways.
James Youngblood Henderson reiterated
the importance of the peace and good order
clause:
It's very important that you understand that
in the oral tradition it's the last thing that
you agree upon [that] is most important. Because none of the other agreements are binding if you don't agree with the last clause.
So if you're a literate person in English you
go, "What's number one?" ... But in an oral
tradition, it's the last story that you agree to
that bundles the whole negotiations up. And
that last thing that they, [the Indians1, agreed
to is that they'd be in control of all the ceded
territory. So their governments would remain
just like they were, except they would have
a little more responsibility than they would
ordinarily have over their people .... And
there is nothing in the Treaties about how
the white people are going to govern them-

selves .... They aren't going to govern anything-if you just read the Treaties. 58
While one might argue that this interpretation of the mutual clause does not seem
compatible with the government view of the
treaties one could as easily argue that the government view could be construed to support
this conclusion. In the early 1870s (both before and after the creation of the North-West
Mounted Police) the Dominion of Canada was
searching to establish peace and good order in
their newly acquired and "unoccupied" resource-rich hinterland. Ottawa wanted to avoid
the mistakes made by the United States or the
Hudson's Bay Company, and govern at minimal cost. Thus they entered into treaties of
"mutual" peace, friendship, land surrender, and
assistance with the Indigenous nations.
According to Henderson, such treaties secured peaceful relations with the Native populace, but they were also an attempt to control
"uninhabited" territory at minimal cost. Thus,
while the imperial Crown's prime objective
was to arrange peaceful land surrenders with
the First Nations and avoid "Indian wars," the
peace and good order clause confirmed Native peoples in temporary control of their lands
and resources to ward off claims from the US,
to secure Euro-Canadian access to resources
and, in time, to give way to the new settlers.
Henderson claims that, apparently, the Colonial Office of the imperial government "devised a prototype of all colonial documents,
that also is no less of authority in British law
than the grants to the House of Commons, the
House of Lords or the Courts." In fact the peace
and good order clause may have originally have
been intended to function as did the Peace,
Order, and Good Government clause (Indians
already had Good Government) in the British
North America Act of 1867. Both are overriding clauses that provide the foundation upon
which to govern. As Wilton Littlechild points
out, however, this may be interpreted as Indians agreeing to abide by Canadian law. Nonetheless, he says that "our people will still say
no, we agreed to obey and abide by our law."59
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It looks as if the Crown agreed to have the
chiefs and minor chiefs either share the responsibility for, or be solely responsible for, maintaining peace and good order, if only among
their own peoples and as a temporary measure.
The leaders of the Blood, Peigan, and Siksika
nations had the shared responsibility of maintaining peace and good order throughout their
"ceded" (shared) territories. The Crown
"granted" this responsibility, presumably as a
temporary measure and possibly one meant to
be shared with the North-West Mounted Police and, to a small extent, the Dominion government. 60
Like a river, however, the prairies have been
changed and altered. Settlement occurred, colonial governing structures (i.e., provinces)
were created, the N orth-West Mounted Police
disbanded and were recreated as the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police, treaty promises
were broken, and the federal government's Indian policy was implemented. Nonetheless, this
clause still holds true, even though it has long
been forgotten. Many Blackfoot still retain
their interpretation of the responsibilities outlined in the treaty-including the responsibility to maintain peace and good order in their
traditional territories -and continue to argue
that much of what the government has done
has been against the spirit and intent of the
treaty.
Despite the fact that the promise outlined
in the last clause in Treaty Number Seven was
never fully implemented, the Blackfoot Confederacy retain their sovereignty and their responsibility to maintain peace and good order
throughout their respective traditional territories. Given that their lands are now "occupied" and the North-West Mounted Police
are no longer responsible for the maintenance
of peace and good order, this promise cannot
be viewed as it was at the time of the treaty,
but the promise still stands, even though its
exact implications are unclear.
The peace and good order clause really
makes two major promises to the Blackfoot
Confederacy. The first implies they will keep
their sovereignty while the second promises
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that the chiefs and minor chiefs will share the
responsibility to maintain peace and order.
While the first of these has often been construed as the recognition of an inherent right
to self-government, the promise entails more
than that. It is a recognition of sovereignty,
and a recognition of the Indigenous signatories' understanding that they would go on living according to their laws, customs, and
traditions without interference from the
Queen, except to help them adapt to a new
way of life and to assist them wherever required. Aboriginal nations still retain sovereignty within the reserve, but outside the
reserve sovereignty and jurisdiction, though
limited by promises made in the treaty still
exist in some form. According to Henderson,
The chiefs and headmen delegated limited
authority to the proper legislative authority
or federal government over alcohol and to
the "Government of the ceded country" in
harvesting of natural resources in the shared
or ceded land .... [The hunting, trapping
and fishing rights] section shows that First
Nations knew how to delegate authority to
other governments. Lacking such affirmative language, no implied authority exists
in the Crown. As the treaties illustrate, the
imperial Crown authority over First Nations
and the shared territory is derivative, not
inherent. 61
While the "mutual clause" may be seen as a
recognition of sovereignty and the right to selfgovernment (possibly on and off reserve), the
clause also entails promises to share in the responsibility to maintain peace and good order
throughout the ceded or shared territories.
While we can partially reconstruct what this
meant in 1877, the exact meaning of the clause
today is difficult to determine. It is no longer
possible for the chiefs and minor chiefs to
assist the North-West Mounted Police, and
the traditional ways of the Blackfoot Confederacy cannot be recreated. Nevertheless, the
"mutual clause" guarantees Aboriginal signatories the right and responsibility to share in
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maintaining peace and good order, a right held
by the respective nations and exercised by the
leaders. This treaty right could be implemented
in a plethora of ways, but implementation must
adhere to the spirit and intent of the promise
as well as the treaty in its entirety.
Although establishing bilateral nation-tonation relationships between the Crown and
the leaders of the Blackfoot Confederacy would
be the ultimate manner in which to implement the right, this is highly unlikely, as is
allowing the Indigenous leaders to enforce
traditional laws amongst the non-Native populace or even their own peoples. A more plausible alternative would be the construction of
a system of particularistic representation that
respects the nature of the nation-to-nation
relationship and the spirit and intent of the
Treaty. This need not exclude other possible
plans of implementation, such as developing
self-government or partnerships in the administration of justice, or the co-management of
resources. 62
What the treaty guarantees is not explicit
parliamentary representation but rather a suitably modernized way for the .Blackfoot Confederacy to share in the maintenance of peace
and good order. Parliamentary representation
is a plausible mechanism for the respective
communities to share responsibility. This could
also be achieved through the creation of a
separate but parallel parliament or even the
recreation of the Senate, turning it from an appointed body from the dominant culture to a
council of the signatories of the Numbered
Treaties or possibly all Aboriginal peoples.
Parliamentary representation is desirable
because the true governing body of today is
the federal government or, in some cases, the
provincial government, not the North-West
MountedPolice that implemented the laws in
the 1870s. Since dominant society has failed
to respect the laws or ways of the Indigenous
peoples today, as was suggested in the early
interpretations of the treaties, a new relationship that respects Indigenous ways has to be
constructed. Although one may argue that participation in an "alien" parliament is con-

trary to the promise of sovereignty and a nation-to-nation relationship, this does not have
to be the case. Sovereign nation states have
participated, as nations, in shared structures
of governance. There are numerous examples
of political confederacies (including the Blackfoot Confederacy and the Iroquois Confederacy) that existed long before colonization,
and sovereign nation-states such as Britain
participate in various forms of "alien" governmental structures including the European
Parliament, the United Nations, and the
Commonwealth. A system of differentiated
parliamentary representation could be structured that respected Aboriginal nations within
Canada and re-established nation-to-nation
relationships with the Canadian nation-state.
A system that recognizes the existence of nations and enables the Siksika, Blood, and
Peigan, and Tsuu T'ina and Stoney nations to
share in the responsibility for maintaining
peace and order, particularistic representation
would be a contemporary adaptation of Treaty
Seven. The recognition of nationhood, sovereignty, shared responsibility, and a nationto-nation relationship must be the underlying
principles of a system of guaranteed representation.,
Although particularistic representation
might at first consideration appear to be prohibited by the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, as a treaty right, it is entrenched in
the Constitution. The Canadian Constitution
not only affirms treaty and aboriginal rights in
Section 35, but it also provides in Section 25
that the Charter "shall not be construed so as
to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal,
treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain
to the aboriginal peop Ie of Canada ... "63 Thus
Aboriginal people are "citizens plus," whose
"special" rights are constitutionally shielded
from other citizens and protected against the
Charter's sphere of influence. Although a treaty
right to guaranteed parliamentary representation-or even the treaty promise of a mutual
responsibility for peace and good order-is
not explicitly recognized in the Constitution,
neither are other treaty rights enumerated
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constitutionally. The argument of this paper
has been that guaranteed representation is a
plausible and practical way of activating a
major Treaty Seven promise that has lain dormant since 1877.
Based upon the concept presented above,
one can justifiably state that a treaty right to
parliamentary representation is constitutionally permissible, as it is a constitutionally
entrenched right. This conclusion is not revolutionary or unsubstantiatable, as several
scholars and all of the national Aboriginal
political organizations have asserted that guaranteed representation is a treaty and Aboriginal right. Even the Royal Commission on
Electoral Reform and Party Financing attempted to construct such an argument when
they reported that
Since Section 25 of the Charter places Aboriginal people in a special constitutional
position, there is no valid reason to believe
the establishment of such a right to direct
representation through a well crafted process whereby they could vote in Aboriginal
constituencies would not survive any challenge in the courts that sought to demonstrate that this right had a negative impact
on the equality rights of other Canadians. 64
I have not attempted to suggest how such a
system of representation could be constructed
or how the rights of the signatories to Treaty
Seven should affect other Aboriginal nations
and individuals in Canada. I have, however,
endeavored to show how, in the context of
today's conditions, the Treaty Seven clause acknowledging that the mutual responsibility for
peace and good order of the "shared" or
"ceded" territories lay with both the Aboriginal and Euro-Canadian adherents can be construed as leading to guaranteed parliamentary
representation for Aboriginal peoples in
Canada.
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